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Some countries produce more multinational enterprises (MNEs) than others. India and China, in 
particular, have produced a number of dynamic MNEs whose success abroad generates important 
economic benefits for the home economy. Motivated by this observation, we describe the 
internationalisation record of Indonesia’s major business groups. Using an archival analysis method we 
find that, with a few exceptions, Indonesia’s largest business groupings focus predominantly upon the 
domestic market. We advance two explanations for this investment pattern. The first suggests that the 
apparent absence of Indonesian MNEs is an accounting error, because firms’ outward investment is 
under-reported in official statistics. The second suggests that Indonesian outward foreign direct 
investment is impeded by a combination of institutional and firm-level factors that arrest the 
internationalisation of all but the largest firms. We discuss the policy implications of these findings and 
reflect on their theoretical implications.  
INTRODUCTION 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) from Asian countries such as India and China are becoming major 
players in the globalised world economy, and their recent dynamism has attracted much attention from 
scholars (for example, Buckley et al. 2007). Economists and management scholars agree that outward 
direct investment (ODI) by emerging market MNEs strengthens their competitive advantage and 
provides their countries of origin with a number of economic benefits, including improved export 
performance and access to foreign technology (UNCTAD 2006). Low ODI may signal lagging 
international competitiveness, and is therefore of potential concern to policy makers. Research to date has 
focused almost exclusively on emerging markets that produce successful MNEs; scant attention has been 
given to explaining why some emerging markets engender relatively few multinational firms.  
Indonesia’s record is somewhat unclear in this regard. Research suggests that some Indonesian 
firms have successfully internationalised (Lecraw 1993), especially those owned and controlled by 
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Chinese Indonesians (Liu 2001; Sato 1993). Yet official statistics show that Indonesia has produced few 
substantial MNEs. In the past five years, Indonesia did not have a single firm in the top 100 non-financial 
transnational corporations from developing countries, according to an annual ranking published by 
UNCTAD. The latest list, released in 2010, shows Singapore as having seven representatives, Malaysia six 
and both Thailand and the Philippines one firm each. In firm-level data on the number of new overseas 
greenfield investments undertaken in the past five years, Indonesia almost fails to register, its score 
dwarfed by those of the big players in the region – India, China and Malaysia – and well below those of 
Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines (figure 1).
1
 In short, these metrics point to a relatively modest 
international investment record on Indonesia’s part.  
----FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE---- 
Opinion is divided on how to interpret Indonesian ODI statistics. Indonesian officials often point to 
the idiosyncrasies of their economy and stress disadvantages of ODI such as capital flight and tax 
evasion. Officials also assume that ODI metrics under-estimate actual outward investment because 
Indonesian firms may misreport or under-state their foreign investments. Consequently, the international 
performance of Indonesian firms is difficult to measure, and the appropriate stance of the Indonesian 
government on ODI policy remains unresolved. Improved understanding of Indonesian firms’ ODI 
performance can inform the policy debate on whether the governments of Indonesia and other emerging 
market countries should implement policies to accelerate or otherwise influence their ODI.  
We contribute to this debate by documenting the internationalisation patterns of Indonesia’s 
largest business groupings and developing plausible explanations for them. To do so we use an archival 
analysis method that identifies ODI activities (hereafter ‘events’) undertaken by Indonesia’s largest 
business groups over a 13-year period. Whereas official statistics give an aggregated overview of ODI, the 
contribution of our methodology is to provide fine-grained insight into the international investment 
record of specific firms. We focus upon the ODI of firms affiliated with 25 of Indonesia’s largest business 
groups, because we expect them to be the best endowed with the resources necessary for international 
expansion. We begin with a brief review of evidence and theory on emerging economy ODI. We then 
outline some shortcomings of ODI accounting in Asia’s emerging markets. We report our 
internationalisation findings on Indonesian business groups and suggest two explanations. Our 
conclusion discusses implications for policy and theory.  
                                                 
1 The city-states of Singapore and Hong Kong are excluded from figure 1 (and figure 2, below) because their ODI data 
are inflated by pass-through investments that originate in other countries. 
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FDI AND ODI IN ASIA 
In recent decades Asia’s industrialising states have embraced inward foreign direct investment (FDI) as 
part of their industrial policy programs. States such as China, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore 
have offered generous investment incentives to foreign MNEs to boost economic development. Since the 
early 1970s Indonesia too has made its foreign investment rules more accommodating, albeit with 
occasional back-tracking (Hofman, Zhao and Ishihara 2007). On the other hand, industrialising states 
have been more circumspect about the promotion of outward direct investment by domestic firms, 
because of concerns about capital flight and tax evasion, and the fear that ODI ‘hollows out’ domestic 
industry by transferring jobs to other countries.  
ODI can benefit the originating country’s economy only if it has a positive impact on the 
performance of the parent firm undertaking a foreign project. There are both risks and benefits associated 
with ODI. The risks include unfavourable movements in exchange rates, failure to understand foreign 
business practice and cultures, and additional managerial costs associated with coordinating 
geographically dispersed operations. Realisation of ODI’s potential benefits will depend upon the parent 
firm’s objectives and its organisational capabilities. Scholars and policy analysts typically distinguish 
three distinct motives for undertaking ODI: efficiency-, asset- and market-seeking motives. Efficiency-
seeking ODI is directed at accessing low-cost inputs such as cheap labour and materials. Asset-seeking 
ODI is directed at the acquisition of technology, marketing skills, research and development (R&D) 
laboratories and distribution facilities that are unavailable in the home market but can improve the parent 
firm’s competitive capabilities. Market-seeking ODI is aimed at generating revenues in foreign markets; 
its occurrence assumes that the parent firm possesses a proprietary capability that gives it an advantage 
over local firms in those markets. Each type of ODI can improve the firm’s performance by lowering its 
costs, increasing its competitiveness or providing additional revenues. 
There has been something of a sea change in the importance states attach to having their own 
MNEs. Recent statistics report a surge in ODI from emerging economies, most of it originating in Asia 
(UNCTAD 2006). States increasingly recognise ODI’s potential to enhance the international 
competitiveness of domestic firms. They also perceive that accelerating the development of local MNEs 
can improve competitiveness within the domestic market, because knowledge of international best 
practice and technological know-how can spill over and be diffused through linkages with local suppliers 
and competitive imitation by rivals. Foreign technology and practice are often more valuable in the hands 
of domestic firms, whose superior local knowledge allows modification to fit domestic conditions 
(Szulanski 1996). Market-seeking ODI is critical to consolidating export sales and market expansion. It 
helps firms to develop international networks and relationships through which they can initiate activities 
rather than serving merely as dependent sub-contractors at the periphery of international value chains. 
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Lecraw (1993) suggests that Indonesian firms engaging in ODI improved both their management 
expertise and their export performance to a greater extent than firms that did not make such investments.  
Concern that ODI results in the loss of domestic employment may be over-stated. Evidence from 
emerging markets in fact suggests that ODI has a marginally positive impact upon aggregate 
employment levels (UNCTAD 2006: 189). Lost jobs are more closely associated with efficiency-seeking 
ODI, such as occurs when parent firms seek cheaper labour abroad. Emerging market MNEs are unlikely 
to undertake efficiency-seeking ODI because of the continuing availability of low-cost domestic labour. 
They are more likely to undertake asset-seeking ODI projects, which generally have a positive impact on 
employment levels at home.  
While Indonesia’s inward FDI performance has recently been quite strong –its ODI record appears 
less so from the data presented above. Nevertheless, if we look at aggregate ODI scaled by GDP, 
Indonesia seems to be on a par with other emerging Asian economies (figure 2). When ODI is measured 
relative to economy size, Malaysia emerges as a clear front-runner during the years 2005–09. There is little 
to differentiate India, Indonesia, Thailand and China, although this group is well in front of the 
Philippines and Vietnam.  
----FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE---- 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO ODI FROM EMERGING MARKETS 
Research on emerging market MNEs has been under way for several decades. More recently, the 
emergence of Chinese and Indian multinational enterprises has given new impetus to this research 
stream. One point of consensus in the research is that the international activity of MNEs from advanced 
countries is attributable to the creation and leverage of proprietary technological and organisational 
capabilities that drive their market-seeking ODI. By contrast, scholars believe that firms from emerging 
markets typically lack the firm-specific advantages required to compete successfully in international 
markets. This is because economic and competitive conditions in the host country provide few country-
specific advantages conducive to the development of world-class organisational and technological 
competence.  
The consensus of research on emerging market MNEs is that many firms internationalise for asset-
seeking reasons – that is, to acquire resources and competencies that are unavailable locally (Luo and 
Tung 2007). Child and Rodrigues (2005) suggest, for example, that Chinese firms’ international strategies 
seek to address competitive disadvantage. To bring their skills up to par, firms must invest considerable 
resources in learning, either  through the formation of strategic partnerships or the gradual accumulation 
of skills, information and technologies (Hobday 1995). To the extent that emerging market firms can 
leverage their competencies in foreign markets, scholars think that these skills are derived from the 
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capacity to manage in harsh or corrupt environments (Cuervo-Cazzura and Genc 2008), but such 
capacities are of less value in more advanced markets.  
Aside from firm-specific factors, external factors such as home-country institutions also influence 
ODI (Peng, Wang and Jiang 2008). Advanced economies typically benefit from a functioning matrix of 
institutions, comprising enforceable contracts, government regulation and efficient capital markets. They 
also possess a diverse array of specialised institutions such as standards committees, accreditation 
agencies, consumer watchdogs, market research firms, executive recruitment agencies, business schools 
and vocational training institutes that facilitate market transactions. Niskanen (1991: 223) has described 
these institutions as the ‘soft infrastructure of the market economy’. In contrast, many emerging markets 
are characterised by extensive institutional and market failure – a condition that management and finance 
scholars term an ‘institutional void’ (Khanna and Palepu 1997).  
However, scholars disagree about whether institutional voids are an asset or a liability for the 
internationalisation of firms. On the one hand, institutional voids such as weak regulations or unenforced 
product safety standards can create negative perceptions of a country’s enterprises that inhibit their 
foreign expansion, while institutional voids in capital markets can deprive firms of the resources needed 
to pursue international opportunities.  
On the other hand, institutional voids can stimulate the formation of MNEs if they facilitate the 
emergence of large diversified business groups. Diversified business groups can arise and thrive in 
emerging markets because of their capacity to span institutional voids by internalising market failures. 
Business groups that attain sufficient scale can do this by substituting for missing soft market 
infrastructure, and can provide their affiliates with resources such as capital, experienced management, 
finance, technology, and marketing and political lobbying services (Khanna and Palepu 1997). Compared 
with free-standing firms, the affiliates of large business groups enjoy considerable advantages in 
assembling the resources needed to pursue international opportunities. Institutional voids can also 
stimulate foreign expansion if they cause domestic firms to flee home-country conditions. For instance, 
weak intellectual property protection and a lack of venture capital may drive small high-technology firms 
to internationalise in order to gain access to foreign capital markets and better legal protection for their 
intellectual property (Yamakawa, Peng and Deeds 2008). Similarly, political risks and the threat of 
expropriation in volatile emerging markets may drive firms to invest abroad (Witt and Lewin 2007). In 
summary, much existing research suggests that emerging market firms internationalise both because of 
and in spite of home-country conditions. 
Both institutional voids and business groups are a feature of Indonesia’s business environment, 
and there are incentives for Indonesian firms to engage in ‘institutional escape’. World Bank indicators of 
6 
 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and ability to control corruption reveal 
Indonesia to have significantly negative coefficients of state governance capacity (Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi 2007). World Economic Forum indices show that Indonesia ranks low on factors such as goods 
market efficiency, financial market sophistication, technological readiness and protection of property 
rights. For instance, on a measure of intellectual property protection, Indonesia ranks 102nd in a survey of 
134 countries (Schwab and Porter 2008). In both Indonesia and Malaysia, government discrimination 
against business people of Chinese descent may also spur internationalisation.  
In view of the rise in ODI from emerging markets in the last decade, the literature tends to focus 
primarily on why firms internationalise (drivers) rather than on what obstacles might prevent them from 
competing in global markets (inhibitors). Our contribution is to complement existing literature by looking 
at the interplay between institutional and organisational factors that enable and inhibit 
internationalisation, and at how these factors affect different firms. In doing this we help to explain why 
some firms fail to internationalise. In combination, theories of institutional drivers and obstacles promise 
to offer a more balanced account of globalisation of firms from emerging markets.  
ACCOUNTING FOR ODI IN EMERGING MARKETS  
Scholars typically use aggregate statistics such as the volume of annual inward and outward FDI flows to 
assess a country’s international investment performance. Business scholars also use firm-level indicators 
such as the percentage of sales derived from overseas or the percentage of assets located outside the 
home country. However, official statistics on ODI collected by organisations such as the OECD and the 
United Nations, and used to construct country-level and firm-level indices of internationalisation, do not 
necessarily provide an accurate picture of ODI from emerging markets. These statistics may significantly 
over- or under-estimate the true level of ODI, because they fail to take account of institutional factors and 
firm practices in such markets. 
One indication of over-estimation is that a small number of emerging economies are responsible 
for a very high share of ODI outflows. For example, in 2005 just four economies (Hong Kong, the British 
Virgin Islands, Russia and Singapore) accounted for 60% of the stock of ODI from developing and 
transition economies (UNCTAD 2006). Much of this presumed investment may be statistically inflated by 
the phenomenon of ‘round tripping’ – a term that refers to capital outflows channelled offshore into 
special-purpose entities that subsequently return the funds to the economy of origin, usually to take 
advantage of inward foreign investment incentives.  
Official statistics may also under-state the extent of emerging economy ODI. Official statistics on 
ODI are founded on the assumption of direct or indirect ownership of subsidiaries, associate companies 
and branches by a common parent (OECD 1999). This assumption may be invalid if firms display 
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fragmented ownership or if they achieve control over foreign firms by non-ownership means. Firms in 
emerging markets are often organised as business groups whose inter-organisational linkages are not 
necessarily characterised by legal ownership, but whose members are integrated through a variety of 
other social and informal mechanisms (Khanna and Palepu 1997). Business group affiliates located in 
different national jurisdictions may transfer resources to other affiliates through devices such as related-
party transactions (Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis 2006). In addition, investment and trade are often 
conducted through ethnic and family networks in a manner that blurs the origin and destination of 
capital flows (Rauch 2001). To the extent that ODI statistics reflect ownership assumptions that are not 
apposite in Asia, they may under-estimate the true extent of firms’ international activities.  
In much of Asia a substantial proportion of a country’s largest publicly listed firms are affiliated 
with a business group (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 1999). In Indonesia the figure is almost 
70% (Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000). This fact poses a considerable empirical challenge, because 
capital flows among affiliates are often non-transparent. In emerging markets, institutional voids such as 
weak property rights and inefficient contract enforcement result in little support for transactions, and 
firms come to rely on informal arrangements such as family ties, government connections and business 
group structures to support transactions with their business partners. As in other emerging markets, 
many Indonesian firms have become affiliated with business groups with pyramidal and opaque 
corporate governance structures that are believed to facilitate and obscure inter-firm resource exchanges 
(Morck and Yeung 2003). Pyramidal structures and weak disclosure standards suggest that the financial 
data disclosed by individual companies may paint a misleading picture of the disposition of their assets. 
This means that firm-based measures of internationalisation, such as those created in the the UNCTAD 
Transnational Index (which identifies the world’s largest multinational firms based upon their foreign’ 
assets, sales, employment is derived from annual reports) may not accurately reflect the true international 
scopeof firms affiliated with Indonesian business groups. Moreover, many Indonesian outward foreign 
investments might not be initiated by publicly listed companies, because families have an incentive to 
maximise control over foreign currency management within the group, which would be subject to 
restrictions if a listed company were involved. 
It is generally believed that official statistics on Indonesia’s FDI and ODI suffer several 
shortcomings (Hattari and Rajan 2008). Most experts consider official ODI figures to be under-stated. 
Indeed, our interviews suggest that Indonesia’s large business groups face incentives to ‘hide’ their 
foreign investments. Because the owners of most of the large business groups are of Chinese descent, ODI 
carries the stigma of disloyalty to Indonesia, and is often portrayed negatively in the Indonesian press. To 
avoid problems, large business group owners often set up platforms in Hong Kong or Singapore from 
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which internationalisation is pursued. Such activities prevent the foreign investments from being 
reported in official Indonesian statistics. 
ARCHIVAL ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY  
We use a qualitative archival analysis method to complement official macro-level and firm-level statistics 
– namely, systematic collection and coding of published news sources. We focus on business groups 
because most Indonesian firms operate as part of a group. In addition, the UNCTAD list of the world’s 
largest transnational companies from developing countries shows that many of the emerging market 
MNEs are business groups. We began by identifying the largest business groups in Indonesia, and then 
documented cases of their internationalisation using a database of worldwide news articles. To 
contextualise our results and facilitate explanation, we conducted background interviews with several 
bankers and executives from the Jakarta business community. 
First, we identified Indonesia’s top 25 domestic privately owned business groups. Because most 
such groups are owned by families, we were able to estimate the approximate size of the business groups 
from reports of family wealth. We constructed a list of the largest groups in the country using the 
following four sources: a report on Indonesia’s largest business groups developed by the global financial 
services firm UBS; a report on Indonesia’s 40 richest families in the Forbes international business 
magazine; the September 2007 issue of the Indonesian business magazine Globe Asia), which included a 
list of the top business groups (pp. 32–128); and the August 2007 issue of Globe Asia, which contained a 
list of Indonesia’s richest individuals (pp. 29–136). We limited ourselves to the top 40 from each source. 
(In the UBS report there was no ranking.) The sources agreed on the 15–20 main groups, diverging more 
in relation to the smaller groups. On the basis of size and inclusion in multiple sources, we selected 25 
business groups. An overview of the four lists, together with our combined list, can be found in table 1. 
----TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE---- 
Second, we conducted a structured search of each group’s foreign business activities in the 
LexisNexis news media database. Substantial foreign investments are typically reported in the business 
news media in Indonesia and/or in the country receiving the investment. The use of each group’s name 
as a keyword elicited a considerable number of articles for each of the top 25 groups (table 2). To deepen 
the pool of articles on each group’s activities, we performed complementary searches using the names of 
group owners and of prominent group-affiliated companies. 
Third, we conducted a content analysis and coding procedure recommended by Boyatzis (1998) 
and used in an Indonesian context by Dieleman and Sachs (2008). We first condensed the raw data into 
‘business events’ – discrete strategic decisions taken by a focal company. Examples of such events include 
starting a new line of business, forming a strategic alliance, exiting a business, initiating a merger, and 
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expanding production capacity (either in Indonesia or abroad). Events that were a continuation of an 
already existing line of business, such as the introduction of a new brand or the upgrading of an existing 
manufacturing plant, were not taken into account. Between 1994 and 2006 – a period of some 13 years – 
we identified a total of 958 business events (n = 958) for our sample. We selected 1994 as a starting point 
because before that year our database contained too few events for most of the top 25 companies in the 
list.  
Fourth, to determine a business group’s international activities we employed a simple count of 
occurrences of ODI in the reported business events, using presence/non-presence coding (Boyatzis 1998), 
and identified 197 (n = 197) unique ODI cases and their destinations. In this way we created a 13-year 
inventory of foreign investments by large Indonesian business groups. The use of presence/non-presence 
coding does not enable us to assess the importance of any specific ODI occurrence, but this can be done 
by going back to the original rich data about each event and interpreting a series of separate events as an 
emergent pattern. The richer underlying data were used to formulate explanations for our results, which 
now follow.  
In concluding this section we note some shortcomings in our archival analysis methodology. Not 
all foreign investments are reported in news media articles, which typically show a bias toward the 
reporting of large investments. As with all sources, news articles can only partially resolve the problem of 
non-disclosure of foreign investments. For example, conversations with members of the Jakarta business 
community suggest the existence of substantial foreign investments that have gone unreported in the 
news media. Consequently, we expect that our data could be biased, because some groups have adopted 
non-disclosure policies in their corporate communications. Despite these evident shortcomings, we 
propose that our data, in combination with existing macro-level and firm-level statistics, provide a fuller 
and more accurate depiction of Indonesian business groups’ ODI activities than has existed hitherto. 
RESULTS 
Table 2 contains the sample of 25 business groups; the keywords used in the LexisNexis search; the 
number of news articles retrieved for each business group; the number of business events abstracted; and 
the number of ODI occurrences. One group (Wings) was discarded because there was too much ‘noise’: 
there were too many companies and products named ‘Wings’ worldwide, and it was not easy to 
distinguish when the Indonesian company was being referred to. We found foreign investments in our 
database for 16 of the remaining 24 groups.  




The data in table 2 suggest that Indonesian business groups have little appetite for international activity. 
Of the 24 largest groups, most have hardly ventured abroad in the past 13 years. Our results show that 
eight groups (33%) display no internationalisation at all – at least in a manner that is captured by our 
methodology. An even larger proportion display only a very limited degree of international activity. In 
general, groups with no foreign investments tend to be smaller.  
We labelled groups with more than 30 ODI events over the 13 years ‘emerging market giants’; 
those with 6–30 ODI events ‘intermediate’ (intermediately internationalised) groups; and those with five 
ODI events or fewer ‘domestic’ groups. This classification is arbitrary, but table 2 shows that two groups 
are clearly outliers, with over 60 ODI occurrences each; there is a small cluster of intermediately 
internationalised companies, and a large group of companies with hardly any ODI occurrences. Based on 
this classification, only two groups (Salim and Lippo) can be considered as emerging market MNEs, and 
these two groups are in fact closely related (historically, at least): the founder of the Lippo Group 
(Mochtar Riady) worked for the founder of the Salim Group (Liem Sioe Liong) before striking out on his 
own. Only seven groups had more than five ODI occurrences over the 13-year period. This low level of 
internationalisation is in marked contrast with what is revealed by the literature on ethnic Chinese firms 
from Southeast Asia: they are typically portrayed as transnational empires that invest extensively in the 
region and in China (Yeung 2004). Given that all but three groups in our sample are controlled by 
families of Chinese descent, with two notable exceptions our research does not support the notion of 
these families running ‘transnational’ enterprises in the Indonesian case. Rather, table 2 suggests that a 
substantial category of large Indonesian business groups is focused almost exclusively on the domestic 
market. 
If we compare our results to ODI statistics on Indonesia, there are evident discrepancies. In 2006 
alone we recorded 18 foreign investments for the Lippo group. Returning to the original news articles to 
assess the significance of these investments, we found that Lippo’s media-reported investments summed 
to almost $2 billion, whereas Indonesia posted total official ODI of $2.7 billion in 2006. While Lippo is a 
large group, it seems unlikely that it alone accounted for almost all of Indonesia’s ODI in that year. This 
example suggests that errors in either or both figures are likely, because official statistics under-estimate 
ODI and because reported investments may not match actual investments. Notwithstanding these 
discrepancies, our data appear to point in the same direction as the official statistics, in the sense that we 
found relatively limited ODI among Indonesia’s largest business groups.  
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Distribution of ODI occurrences 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the 197 foreign investments by company. Salim and Lippo account for 
almost 70% of the reported ODI events, suggesting that these are by far the most internationally active of 
the Indonesian business groups (with the caveat that we are focusing on events, and not money 
amounts). The news reports show that these groups have established footholds in Hong Kong and 
Singapore, diversifying internationally from there. In fact, one Salim Group firm, First Pacific Company, 
even made it into the UNCTAD top 100 non-financial transnational companies from developing 
countries, listed as a firm from Hong Kong. A third group, Sinar Mas, displays a similar pattern, albeit on 
a much smaller scale. All three groups control listed companies in Singapore, and have appointed 
second-generation family members as executives responsible for directing the internationalisation of their 
group’s activities. By locating their international activities in a foreign jurisdiction these groups can to 
some extent disguise their ODI activities so as to avoid charges of taking capital out of Indonesia. 
Consequently, their foreign investments are unlikely to turn up in official ODI figures for Indonesia. In 
this respect, our database is more complete than the official data. 
ODI destination 
Figure 4 provides the destinations of Indonesian business groups’ ODI. The pattern of investments shows 
that most Indonesian business groups are primarily regional rather than global players – a phenomenon 
that has been documented for other Asian firms (Collinson and Rugman 2007). The primary destinations 
of Indonesian ODI are China, Singapore, Australia, India, the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam – 
Australia being the only developed country destination of any importance. The high levels of investment 
in China and India are not surprising, given the size of these economies and their rapid rates of growth. 
The literature on ethnic Chinese family groups suggests that Chinese Indonesians may be inclined to 
invest in their ancestral country – another factor that may also play a role.  
While much of Indonesian ODI is destined for other emerging markets, including those in East and 
Southeast Asia, some firms have invested in more distant emerging markets in Latin America (Raja 
Garuda Mas), Africa (Kalbe Farma), the Middle East (Bakrie, Salim) and Central Asia (Bakrie, Salim). 
These trends are consistent with the suggestion that emerging market firms are more likely to invest in 
other emerging markets, because these markets share institutional characteristics that are similar to those 
in the country of origin (cf. Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc 2008). For example, Buckley et al. (2007) find that 
Chinese firms invest heavily in countries characterised by high political risk, suggesting that Chinese 




Our data show that significant fluctuations in ODI are likely to be related to the business cycle (figure 5). 
The decline in 1996 may have been a harbinger of the AFC, during which ODI fell to very low levels. 
More recently, ODI has shown a strong positive trend. However, given the results discussed above, this 
may be driven primarily by a small number of increasingly global firms. It obscures the prevailing reality 
that ODI is limited in the majority of Indonesia’s large business groups.  
----FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE---- 
----FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE---- 
----FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE---- 
EXPLAINING INDONESIA’S MISSING MNEs 
Relative to its regional neighbours Indonesia generates a limited number of prominent multinational 
firms. Our analysis finds that ODI is driven by a very small number of internationally active business 
groups, and that the majority of Indonesian business groups are focused on domestic activities. To the 
extent that ODI is directed at seeking strategic assets, Indonesia’s economic development may be 
impeded by the absence of a larger number of home-grown MNEs. Given the accounting ambiguity 
about international capital outflows from emerging markets, we now consider whether both official 
statistics and our methodology have under-estimated the true extent of Indonesian firms’ international 
activities. In addition, we consider whether our methodology accurately depicts the limited 
internationalisation of Indonesia’s business groups, and discuss the extent to which institutional voids 
explain the patterns documented above. 
Hidden dragons?  
The first explanation for the apparently limited internationalisation of Indonesian firms is a ‘hidden 
dragons’ explanation. It suggests that domestic factors cause firms to internationalise in a manner that is 
not readily identified by our methods. This explanation suggests that Indonesia’s missing MNEs 
represent a ‘type two error’ or false negative: their ODI is significant but not readily apparent. Possible 
sources of a type two error are of two kinds.  
It may be that our sample of Indonesia’s largest 24 business groups is biased. If the large business 
groups in the sample are more locally oriented than the population of free-standing firms or the affiliates 
of smaller groups, then the missing MNEs might be found among the latter. Our method is unlikely to 




A second possibility is that domestic considerations may encourage business groups to conceal 
their ODI activities in an informal international economy. The informal economy consists of a range of 
activities that are unreported, unrecorded or informally organised (Portes and Haller 2005). We cannot say 
with certainty that the groups in our sample are engaged in any or all three forms of informal activity, but 
we enumerate them as a guide to further research.  
First, it is well established that high tax rates can stimulate an increase in visible ODI as firms seek 
to shift activities to lower tax jurisdictions offshore. Equally, high tax rates can stimulate tax evasion 
through invisible intra-firm transfers such as the use of special purpose entities registered in tax havens 
(OECD 1999). More generally, opaque business group governance structures allow cash to flow upwards 
into privately held family firms that may seek to preserve family wealth and evade home-country taxes 
by channelling resources into unreported foreign investments. While our archival data cannot detect such 
activity, our interviews with analysts and bankers suggest that it is widespread among Indonesian 
groups. One source with experience of Indonesian business groups explained in an interview that, in his 
view, tax reduction was the main rationale for the complex legal structure of Indonesian business groups, 
which tend to span multiple jurisdictions.  
Second, it is well known that ethnic diasporas constitute important networks that facilitate 
international trade (Tung and Chung 2010). Chinese Indonesian business groups may participate in 
ventures with fellow ethnic Chinese through minority investments, but if investments in such projects 
constitute less than 10% of the share capital they are recorded as portfolio investments. Morck, 
Wolfenzon and Yeung (2005) document how family business groups exercise de facto control over great 
swathes of the corporate sector through pyramidal structures with equity ownership stakes of less than 
10%. Similarly, other capital arrangements, such as loans made through a group’s in-house private bank, 
may not be recorded as direct investment, even though a core firm may exercise de facto control of the 
invested firm. To the extent that these investments cross borders they constitute an important source of 
ODI, but they go unrecorded. If Indonesian business groups make extensive use of such financial 
instruments, then their participation in ODI may be under-stated.  
Third, foreign direct investment may go undetected because it occurs within an informal setting. 
Productive foreign investment may be informally organised in an intra-family wealth transfer (Tung and 
Chung 2010). Saxenian (2002) describes the importance of this phenomenon for foreign-born Silicon 
Valley entrepreneurs who raise funds through family networks. In other cases, trading companies 
affiliated with business groups facilitate the operation of global commodity chains (Gereffi 1994), in 
which firms engaged in recurrent relational contracting may control a network of foreign assets without 
actually owning them. Large segments of these chains are organised into informal sub-contract networks 
so as to avoid burdensome regulations. Each of these cross-border capital flows represents significant 
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activity, but is unreported as ODI. This contributes to the under-stating of the scope of international 
activity.  
The above discussion suggests that processes of globalisation have engendered ethnic and 
relational communities that straddle geographic boundaries and are ‘neither here nor there’. 
Entrepreneurs embedded in these communities adopt a form of transnational organisation in which 
foreign direct investment has little meaning, because firms cannot easily be identified with a specific 
national home base (Yeung 2004).  
Missing dragons?  
The second explanation is a ‘missing dragons’ explanation, suggesting that a complex interplay of family 
ownership and management and institutional voids may leave firms with structural characteristics that 
impede ODI. First, family-owned and family-controlled firms typically prefer domestic rather than 
international diversification (Gomez-Mejia, Makri and Kintana 2010). Risk aversion and a desire among 
family management to retain close control constrain family firms’ international opportunities because of 
the high costs associated with coordinating geographically dispersed operations. Sometimes family firms 
limit participation in the senior management team to a small cadre of trusted insiders and are not inclined 
to recruit professional managers with detailed knowledge of international markets. Moreover, the firms’ 
most important social and political networks are based on local connections. Such networks are unlikely 
to help when the firm ventures across international borders.  
. Many large Southeast Asian business groups attained prominence before the widespread 
implementation of liberal market policies and growing globalisation (Yoshihara 1988). These groups 
became especially attuned to the conditions of a pre-liberalisation phase of economic growth and aligned 
their structures and business practices with them. With liberalisation and globalisation these firms 
became increasingly out of tune with emerging business conditions, because they continued to rely on 
their connections instead of developing organisational capabilities that may have facilitated their 
international growth (Carney and Gedajlovic 2002; Dieleman and Sachs 2008).  
This is especially evident in Indonesia, where many business groups emerged in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, when Indonesia relied heavily on import-substitution policies. Consequently, most groups 
developed business models focusing on the local market. The Soeharto era (1966–98) was one of growth, 
but also one of corruption and cronyism, in which ample opportunities were available inside the country 
for the well connected. Entrepreneurs often formed alliances with politicians to secure sector monopolies, 
permissions and licences (Robison 1986), and effectively organised their diversified business groups in 
response to the abundance of local opportunities. In so doing, these groups learned to mobilise resources 
for repeated entry into multiple domestic industrial and commercial projects, but they developed little 
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international experience.  instead,  these large enterprises were able to convert their economic 
power into political power influencing policy and entrenching both market and political power ( ) 
 Refernce is Morck, R., Wolfenzon, D., & Yeung, B. 2005. Corporate governance, economic 
entrenchment, and growth Journal of Economic Literature, 43: 655-720. 
In subsequent decades the ASEAN economies grew rapidly, and business groups were seemingly 
well positioned to expand beyond their domestic strongholds (McVey 1992). However, global capital 
flows created incentives to remain domestically focused. Established business groups mediated, and 
benefited from, the entry of foreign firms into the region (Yoshihara 1988), and served as a major conduit 
for a flood of portfolio investment during the ‘emerging economy fever’ of the early 1990s. These 
continuities illustrate the way dominant organisational forms and the institutional arrangements that 
engender them evolve along path-dependent trajectories. After working so well for so long, the strategies 
became ‘locked in’, creating an administrative heritage (Carney and Gedajlovic 2003) that may have left 
all but the largest groups ill equipped to engage in internationalisation. Management structures that were 
efficiently aligned with the domestic challenges of early-stage industrialisation are now misaligned with 
the tasks of developing firm-specific capabilities that could fuel the firms’ internationalisation. In this 
path-dependent explanation, very few domestically focused business groups are able to abandon their 
deeply rooted business practices and acquire the capabilities needed to succeed in global competition. 
Policy implications 
Should Indonesian governments  pursue policies to accelerate or otherwise influence their ODI? While 
we have been unable to furnish definitive evidence in support of either a ‘hidden dragons’ or a ‘missing 
dragons’ hypothesis, we speculate that both concepts play some part in the explanation of Indonesian 
ODI patterns. First, we suspect that at least some ODI goes unreported. However, unreported ODI is 
unlikely to be associated with asset-seeking investments that could contribute to the development of 
domestic firms’ competitive capabilities. Rather, we suspect that most unreported ODI represents a form 
of institutional escape, perhaps to avoid taxation or to shelter accumulated family wealth from the risks 
of political instability and expropriation. Second, apart from the very largest, we suspect that Indonesia’s 
business groups are too small to compensate effectively for institutional voids. Because of their relatively 
small scale they may lack the managerial, organisational and financial resources for effective pursuit of 
asset-seeking international opportunities that might strengthen their competitive capabilities. The firms 
affiliated with smaller groups may prefer instead to avoid the risks associated with ODI, or may see the 
domestic environment as continuing to provide plentiful lucrative opportunities. 
If business groups are too small to assemble the resources needed for asset-seeking ODI, a more 
active role for the state may be justified. Many of Indonesia’s neighbours have adopted pro-active ODI 
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strategies for this purpose. For example, China initiated a ‘go global’ campaign in the 1990s as part of a 
comprehensive industrial strategy aimed at producing internationally competitive firms. While many 
Singaporean firms are engaging in ODI for efficiency-seeking purposes, Singapore’s sovereign wealth 
funds are engaged in ODI to secure access to strategic technologies. Malaysia too has recently become 
more active in promoting ODI, by offering tax exemptions on income derived from foreign earnings. It 
has also attempted to streamline a range of agencies involved in promoting national industrial 
competitiveness, and gives particular emphasis to investment in other developing countries. This may 
explain why Malaysia’s ODI levels are higher than those of other ASEAN countries. 
A significant constraint for the development of Indonesian MNEs is a shortage of professional 
management and technical personnel. World Economic Forum data show that Indonesia is a middle-
ranking country with respect to ‘reliance on professional management’. It is ranked 54th among 134 
countries, close to China (ranked 53rd), but significantly below Malaysia (22nd) and Singapore (8th). 
Similarly, Indonesia ranks 43rd in the local availability of research and training services, well below 
Singapore (13th) and Malaysia (27th) (Schwab and Porter 2008). The development of high-quality executive 
and technical talent is often the product of experience and first-hand learning through exposure to 
international projects. For example, research on Japanese and South Korean business groups suggests that 
their successful international performance was aided by the systematic development of management 
talent that could be deployed across a range of industries (Ungson, Steers and Park 1997). Researchers 
observe that family-controlled business groups are sometimes reluctant to make comparable investments 
in human resources, and often rely upon family members for senior executive talent (Carney 1998). The 
existence of a corporate elite dominated by family firms, combined with an absence of opportunities for 
managers to learn on the job, may create a self-reinforcing dynamic in which a supply of high-quality 
professional management fails to materialise. Consequently, in addition to pro-active and direct ODI 
policies, states such as Indonesia may also wish to consider indirect policies aimed at developing skilled 
professional managers.  
Theoretical implications 
We believe that our results also have more general theoretical implications for the study of 
internationalisation in emerging-market firms. As our literature review showed, existing research 
emphasises drivers rather than inhibitors of globalisation. This is not surprising, given that UNCTAD 
statistics show a surge in ODI from emerging economies, and that newspapers report frequently on high-
profile cases. However, these indicators alone do not necessarily suggest a general trend in a wider 
population. Instead, our limited study of Indonesian groups suggests that they could reflect a Pareto-type 
(rather than a normal) distribution, with a few ‘extreme’ cases of internationalisation and a long tail of 
firms focusing on the domestic market. Pareto-science is being applied to an expanding set of social 
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phenomena, and is thought to be more appropriate in a context of interdependent actors, complex 
tensions and self-organising effects. Such a setting is common in international management research 
(Andriani and McKelvey 2007).  
The internationalisation of Indonesian groups may similarly be characterised by processes of 
interdependence and self-organisation. Our database contains various events in which a medium-sized 
group (for example, the Ciputra Group) teamed up with a larger group (such as the Salim Group) when 
investing abroad, because the latter was better endowed with resources and foreign contacts. The Lippo 
Group frequently teamed up with business groups from other emerging economies (Malaysia, China), 
which presumably were drawn into the partnership because of Lippo’s international capabilities. In this 
manner, the most international groups perceive more business opportunities than other groups and 
become increasingly experienced and successful, so a ‘positive feedback mechanism’ produces an 
accelerated internationalisation pattern in these firms. In other words, a few first-mover firms can 
overcome obstacles to internationalisation and become ‘extremes’ (Baum and McKelvey 2006) that tend to 
skew aggregate statistics on ODI. If the pattern of internationalisation found among Indonesia’s largest 
firms is representative of other emerging economies, this suggests that a promising new approach lies in 
re-directing research away from assumptions of normal distribution towards a focus on the differential 
dynamics that generate both extreme cases of emerging economy giants and a long tail of firms focused 
on domestic markets. 
CONCLUSION 
We find that very few large Indonesian business groups can be characterised as MNEs, and that most 
either are active only in the domestic market or display limited internationalisation. We suggest two 
explanations for our findings, which we call ‘hidden dragons’ and ‘missing dragons’. The first 
explanation suggests that more Indonesian MNEs exist than have been identified to date, but that some 
go unnoticed in official statistics and in our data. The second suggests that few Indonesian MNEs have 
emerged because, with a very small number of exceptions, Indonesia’s business groups are too small to 
span institutional voids and internalise market failures. Which of our explanations is the more 
persuasive? At present we do not know how much ODI goes undetected, and we assume that we have 
overlooked some ODI events. Yet our understanding of business groups accumulated from past research 
tells us that while our data and official statistics may not be very accurate, they do reflect a general 
pattern of limited internationalisation in Indonesian firms. We contend that both the small size of most 
Indonesian business groups and the familial structure of Indonesia’s corporate sector play a role in 
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Figure 4: ODI Occurrences 
 



































































TABLE 1 Indonesia’s Largest Business Groups 
 














    $ billion $ billion $ billion  
Raja Garuda Mas Sukanto Tanoto and family 6 11 2.00 1.30 2.80 1 
Sampoerna Putera Sampoerna and sons 5 6 3.30 2.20 2.10 2 
Sinar Mas Widjaja family 3 3 4.50 3.10 2.00 3 
Gudang Garam Wonowidjojo family 2 7 2.90 3.50 1.80 4 
Djarum Hartono family 1 5 3.50 4.20 1.40 5 
Wings Kattuari family/Sutanto 
family 
7 14 1.40 1.10 1.00/0.22 7/25 
Bakriea Bakrie family 8 8 2.80 1.05 1.20 6 
Agung Podomoro  Haliman family 20 27 0.60 0.51 0.90 8 
Medcoa Arifin Panigoro 9 22 0.81 0.90 0.82 9 
Salim Salim family 4 2 6.95 2.80 0.80 10 
Lippo Riady family 14 9 2.50 0.59 0.57 11 
Rajawali Peter Sondakh 19 25 0.72 0.51 0.53 12 
Barito Pacific  Prajogo Pangestu and 
family 
17 20 1.10 0.53 0.51 13 
Ramayanab Tumewu family 24 34 0.50 0.40 0.44 14 
Bercab Murdaya Po and family 27 na na 0.35 0.43 16 
ABC  Djojonegoro family 16 12 1.90 0.56 0.36 17 
Paraa Chairul Tanjung and family 15 31 0.53 0.57 0.31 18 
Gajah Tunggal Sjamsul Nursalim and 
family 
21 21 1.10 0.45 0.30 21 
Saratoga Capitalb Edwin Soeryadjaja 18 13 1.60 0.52 0.23 23 
Rodamas Tan family 25 39 0.42 0.38 0.20 27 
Ciputra Ciputra family 30 57 0.24 0.34 0.15 30 
Kalbe Farma Benjamin Setiawan/F.B. 
Aryanto 
11 24 0.73 0.65 0.12 34 
Artha Graha  Tomy Winata (F)/Sugianto 
Kusuma (G) 
38 70 0.18 0.28 0.11 35 
Mulia Gunawan Tjandra  37 48 0.31 0.28 0.08 40 
Bhakti Investama Harry Tanoesoedibyo 10 29 0.57 0.82 na na 
*Groups are ranked based on Forbes family worth. List excludes state-owned groups, foreign multinationals, domestic groups majority owned by 
foreign firms 
a Non-ethnic Chinese ownership. 
b Not on UBS list. 
F: Forbes People Ranking; G: Globe People Ranking 
Sources:  
UBS list: UBS (2006). Indonesian Connections, UBS, Jakarta. (note: no ranking) 
Globe groups ranking: Globe (2007) 100 Top Groups, September. (without state/foreign-owned companies) 
Globe people ranking: Globe (2007) 150 richest individuals, August. 




TABLE 2 Sources and Results 
 
Group Name Search terms Lexis Articles Events in database FDI occurrences Type 
Salim Group Salim 129,964 210 69 Emerging Market Giant 
Lippo Lippo 14,735 153 66 Emerging Market Giant 
Sinar Mas Sinar Mas 3,730 133 11 Intermediate 
Ciputra Ciputra 2,012 37 9 Intermediate 
Sampoerna Sampoerna 8,932 47 8 Intermediate 
Bakrie Bakrie Group 1,282 88 7 Intermediate 
Raja Garuda Mas Raja Garuda Mas 196 28 6 Intermediate 
Kalbe Farma Kalbe Farma 2,111 17 5 Domestic 
Artha Graha Artha Graha 1,583 35 3 Domestic 
Barito Pacific Barito Pacific 2,049 49 3 Domestic 
Gudang Garam Gudang Garam 7,884 14 2 Domestic 
Medco Medco Group 209 23 2 Domestic 
Para Chairul Tanjung 146 13 2 Domestic 
Rodamas Rodamas 74 11 2 Domestic 
Gajah Tunggal Gajah Tunggal 1,942 15 1 Domestic 
Rajawali Rajawali 2,960 23 1 Domestic 
ABC ?? 1,728 3 0 Domestic 
Agung Podomoro Agung Podomoro 32 5 0 Domestic 
Berca Berca 163 20 0 Domestic 
Bhakti Investama Bhakti Investama 1,449 30 0 Domestic 
Djarum Djarum 491 4 0 Domestic 
Mulia Mulia 119 0 0 Domestic 
Ramayana Ramayana 1 0 0 Domestic 
Saratoga Capital Saratoga 291 0 0 Domestic 
Wings Wings  24,039 discarded discarded na 
Total  208,122 958 197  
 
 
 
 
